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1IntroductIon: l aw’s travels 
and transformatIons
Julia Eckert, Zerrin Özlem Biner, Brian Donahoe and Christian 
Strümpell
IntroDuCtIon
the contributors to this volume start from the premise that in the use of 
law, law transforms those who use it, their understanding of the world, 
of their conflicts and their normative orientations – in other words, their 
political subjectivities. At the same time, the essays trace the ways that 
law itself is transformed in iterative processes. these transformations are 
historically contingent on the dialectic between the transformations of 
social relations and subjectivities that law can effect, on the one hand, 
and the transformations in the meaning of laws produced by the inter-
pretations of those who mobilise law for their particular social, political 
or economic struggles, on the other hand. this dialectic reflects the two 
sides of the sociality of law: first, law’s formative impact on social per-
ceptions; and secondly, its very constitution in the social. Attention to 
these dynamics opens our eyes to the creation of new legal understand-
ings – jurisgenesis, to use robert Cover’s (1992) term – that result from 
the active use of existing law.
thE gloBAlISAtIon of lAw
law travels, and there are different ways in which it does so. It mat-
ters to normative processes whether law is imposed by colonial rule or 
imported by a national elite as a component of the modernisation and 
development project; whether it is propagated by activists to claim rights 
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rumours among laypersons who hope it might help them attain justice 
or via networks of experts trying to achieve international standardisa-
tion and global ‘harmonisation’ (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2005). these 
different forms of law’s travels rarely come alone. As David westbrook 
has elaborated, ‘the imperial, the fashionable, the systemic and the tri-
bal’ forms of law’s travels ‘are interrelated’ (westbrook 2006: 504). law’s 
travels are almost always at one and the same time a matter of export 
and import, of imposition and adoption, of expert knowledge and lay 
rumour. these modes of the spread of law and the dynamics between 
them are central to the phenomenon of ‘juridification’, a term that refers 
to a variety of social processes entailed in the proliferation of law.
In recent years, we have been observing an increasing juridification 
of social and political protest worldwide. the global ‘rights discourse’ 
has projected law, particularly human rights law, as the internationally 
intelligible and acceptable language of voicing demands, providing cat-
egories of global scale and linking local concerns with international for-
ums. Analyses of these processes of juridification have often examined 
governmental and commercial actors who propagate the activation and 
implementation of legal norms, such as international organisations (e.g. 
li 2009), ngos (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Merry 2006; levitt and 
Merry 2009), law firms (e.g. garth and Dezalay 1996) and judicial insti-
tutions such as the International Criminal Court (e.g. Anders, this vol-
ume; Clarke 2010). Considering the economic and political impact that 
these actors have, analyses of the ways they promote law and the net-
works within which they operate are indispensable for an understanding 
of law in current global relations.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César rodríguez-garavito, however, 
assert that such ‘realist’ analyses of law’s travels only take into consid-
eration the top-down processes of the globalisation of law, that which 
upendra Baxi in this volume and elsewhere has called the politics of 
human rights. Santos and rodríguez-garavito hold that such a focus on 
the top-down processes of the globalisation of law reproduces the silen-
cing of those subjected to the processes in question: ‘Missing from this 
top-down picture are the myriad local, non-English-speaking actors … 
[t]hese subaltern actors are a critical part of processes whereby global 
legal rules are defined’ (Santos and rodríguez-garavito 2005: 11). we 
argue that such analyses of the top-down processes of globalisation of 
law, important as they are, do more than just dismiss the voices of those 
marginalised. they also assume a unidirectional change and thereby ren-
der impossible any analysis of the dialectic between the implementation 
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-01466-4 - Law against the State: Ethnographic Forays into Law’s Transformations





of legal norms and the diverse ways that local actors adopt them; they do 
not take into account the constitutive effects of what Baxi calls the pol-
itics for rights. In this way, they foreclose a differentiated understanding 
of normative change.
Santos and rodríguez-garavito modestly hold that their notion 
of ‘subaltern cosmopolitan legality’ does not quite amount to a theory 
(2005: 13). nevertheless, we believe that such an approach is indispens-
able for a theory of normative change in two ways: firstly, it directs us 
toward a practice-oriented approach that overcomes assumptions of cul-
tural determinism in the normative realm; secondly, such a perspective 
opens up the possibility for a radically social theory of legal change such 
as we are espousing here.
our approach is thus inspired by the observation that people demon-
strate a startlingly persistent faith in ‘the law’, as evidenced by their ever-
increasing recourse to legal means to settle conflicts, alleviate suffering 
and further their causes. the contributions to this volume explore the 
effects of people’s legal choices, trials and errors in eclectic situated pro-
cesses of juridification. while other notable anthropologists have also 
dealt with such processes of ‘juridification’, they have generally focused 
solely on one body of law, such as Dembour and Kelly (2007) and Clarke 
(2010) on international criminal law, and Merry (2006), goodale (2009, 
2010) and wilson and Mitchell (2003) on human rights law. they critic-
ally examine the effects of such legal processes on the construction and 
regulation of particular types of crimes and identities. while we agree 
with these approaches, our starting point is different: we explore how 
such legal mobilisations articulate with other practices of negotiating 
conflicts, sometimes replacing non-legal means of protest, sometimes 
forming mutually reinforcing interdependent strategies with them. this 
implies following the hopes and practices of people into whatever arenas 
happen to become relevant. In our view, juridification entails not only 
the application of state law against the state, but also the mobilisation of 
different legal orders, such as international human rights law, customary 
law and ‘travelling’ models of conflict resolution. People tend not to be 
trained in the finer distinctions of bodies of law and their jurisdictions, 
and many make their claims with reference to a certain body of law (e.g. 
human rights) even though their specific cases would not fall under the 
purview of that particular body of law as traditionally understood. By not 
focusing on a single body of law we attempt to highlight the heteroge-
neous geography of law and the ways boundaries between different legal 
bodies are blurred in the struggles for rights.
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DEPolItICISAtIon
from its very origins in debates on labour law in the german weimar 
republic, the term ‘juridification’ has critically described processes of 
depoliticisation that are concurrent with the relocation of issues into legal 
arenas. Kirchheimer (1972 [1933]; cf. Anders, Chapter 4 in this volume) 
deployed the term as a polemic against the legal formalisation of labour 
relations, which he saw as severely restricting the possibilities for workers 
and unions to engage in more militant actions. In this way juridification 
drastically depoliticised labour relations (cf. teubner 1987: 9).1 the con-
cept gained prominence in academic debates after habermas observed 
that the development of modern law closely corresponds to wider social 
developments, and showed how they shape each other. habermas dis-
tinguished four thrusts of juridification (Verrechtlichung) in his theory of 
legal evolution. the first thrust reflects and moulds the development of 
the bourgeois state, separating the economy from politics and constitut-
ing the legal person as a subject free to enter into contracts, acquire and 
dispose of property (habermas 1985). habermas’s second thrust entails 
the development of a legal constitutionalisation establishing the notion 
of ‘the rule of law’. the third thrust refers to the democratisation of the 
constitutional powers of the state by the introduction of universal fran-
chise and the freedom of organisation for political associations. finally, 
the fourth thrust marks the constitutionalisation of the economic sys-
tem or the establishment of labour laws guaranteeing collective bargain-
ing and the welfare state.2
Blichner and Molander (2008) further refine the concept of juridi-
fication according to five dimensions of socio-legal processes. the first 
dimension they call ‘constitutive juridification’, which simply describes 
the establishment of a legal order such as a formal constitution. the 
second dimension of juridification they define as law’s expansion and 
differentiation, i.e. its expansion into ‘life-worlds’ it had hitherto not 
regulated. the third dimension is marked by the tendency to solve con-
flict increasingly by reference to law, both in the sense that citizens take 
recourse to courts and in the sense that citizens outside the judiciary also 
1 this concept of juridification has been criticised for the voluntarism inherent in its preoccupa-
tion with strategic choices of conflict or cooperation of labour unions, and for the fact that its 
use has been limited to the politics of organised labour, and thus to only one segment of society 
(teubner 1987: 10).
2 the latter three thrusts thus all aimed at protecting the ‘life-worlds’ that the first thrust endan-
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refer to laws in their attempts to settle disputes.3 Blichner and Molander’s 
fourth dimension of juridification refers to a process by which judicial 
power increases, owing to the indeterminacy and non-transparency of 
law and its applications. the fifth dimension distinguishes processes 
where juridification occurs as legal framing, i.e. the ‘increased tendency 
to understand self and others, and the relationship between self and 
others, in light of a common legal order’ (Blichner and Molander 2008: 
47). this dimension describes the development and the internalisation 
of legal cultures without which – as Blichner and Molander argue – com-
plex legal orders can barely gain stability. It gets at law’s power to shape 
subjectivities, as is illustrated in a number of the chapters in this volume 
(e.g. Biner, Chapter 9; Eckert, Chapter 6; Englund, Chapter 3; and Evren, 
Chapter 10). All of Blichner and Molander’s dimensions are represented 
to one degree or another in the case studies collected here; however, our 
focus corresponds most closely to Blichner and Molander’s third dimen-
sion of juridification, referring to the process whereby law is employed to 
further hopes and express aspirations or protest.4
Juridification has since the coining of the term thus pointed to a pro-
cess of depoliticisation; with juridification, a vast array of social conflicts 
that were once sorted out by political means – in bodies of elected rep-
resentatives or through strikes, boycotts, protests and demonstrations – 
are ever more often mediated through the judicial system (cf. Blichner 
and Molander 2008: 45). In this perspective political decision making is 
reduced to the application of existing law, thereby increasing the power 
of definition and decision making of the judiciary and legally trained 
experts (Bourdieu 1987).5
3 Blichner and Molander (2008: 44) emphasise that this lay legal reasoning does not necessarily 
correspond to law ‘by the book’, and may even refer to laws that do not actually exist, an insight 
that is supported by Julia Eckert’s analysis of rumours of rights (Chapter 6, this volume).
4 As Blichner and Molander point out, these dimensions are not exclusive. they are all closely 
bound up with one another, and all of them are relevant to a greater or lesser degree to our case 
studies.
5 Juridification is also often accompanied by a proliferation of institutionalised legal arenas. with 
their overlapping jurisdictions and competencies these new arenas likewise remain largely unin-
telligible to the citizenry, thereby increasing legal uncertainty rather than strengthening citi-
zens’ rights and enforcing the accountability of governmental institutions. for a good example, 
see Shalini randeria’s (2011) ethnographic study of the dynamics of juridification around the 
forced displacement of residents of a Mumbai slum for a world Bank-funded development pro-
ject. It addresses the disorienting proliferation of ‘quasi-judicial arenas of mediation, arbitration 
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In this manner, ‘[p]olitics itself is migrating to the courts’, where 
‘ordinary political processes [are] held hostage to the dialectic of law and 
disorder’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 26). therefore, the widespread 
‘culture of legality’ is often nothing more than ‘lawfare’, defined by Jean 
and John Comaroff (2006: 30) as ‘the resort to legal instruments, to the 
violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion’. these 
legal instruments often serve powerful political elites and corporate cap-
ital to further their predatory interests in ‘plundering’ natural resources 
(Mattei and nader 2008).
nevertheless, the ‘culture of legality’ has also come to underpin claims 
of marginalised people everywhere in the world. It is ‘not uncommon 
nowadays to hear the language of jurisprudence in the Amazon or 
Aboriginal Australia, in the Kalahari or the new guinea highlands, 
or among the poor in Mumbai, Mexico City, Cape town, and trench 
town’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 26).
whether law can actually serve as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott 1985) 
is, however, an empirical question. while law has the inherent char-
acteristic of legitimating and reproducing the status quo, it can also 
serve to bind those who impose it (thompson 1975: 266–68; lazarus-
Black 1994: 257). Donahoe’s case studies (Chapter 2) show how legal 
instruments are often selectively implemented to allow national and 
international oil and gas companies in russia to gain access to lands his-
torically inhabited by indigenous peoples. this, however, does not stop 
russia’s indigenous peoples from trying to use the courts to protect their 
interests. Stuart Kirsch’s examination of the juridification of indigen-
ous politics (Chapter 1) exemplifies how recourse to the courts can serve 
the interests of indigenous peoples. Kirsch notes that the gap between 
indigenous people’s claims and the expression of those claims in legal 
language can in fact create new political opportunities by yielding ‘legal 
precedents which generate change’ and facilitating ‘the critique of power 
by providing glimpses of alternative ways of being human’. Julia Eckert 
(Chapter 6), too, demonstrates how law ‘gave an [institutionalised] name 
to hopes; it made specific vague ideas of entitlements and the grounds 
on which they were based’, and thus made possible their communication 
and enforcement.
It is thus not a question simply of the effectiveness of law for those 
de-privileged by it, but also one of the particular structuring qualities 
of different arenas in which issues are negotiated. As olaf Zenker and 
Zerrin Özlem Biner discuss in their contributions (Chapters 5 and 9), 
the question of how law relates to more overtly political means of social 
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transformation is an empirical matter that requires ethnographic scru-
tiny. Zenker (Chapter 5), referring to luhmann (1995), argues that
representing [an issue] either in ‘political’ terms that overstate the agency 
and power of the involved actors to define collectively binding rules 
largely at their discretion or in ‘legal’ terms that understate such agency 
and power (as well as the indeterminacy of law) … seems to be more a 
matter of switching between two different and ultimately incommensur-
able codes than an issue of differential ontology … Switching from one 
code to another opens up a limited range of new potential consequences, 
while simultaneously precluding an equally limited set of others. Against 
this backdrop, it becomes an empirical question whether a certain phe-
nomenon is being processed by actors in terms of the political or legal (or 
any other) code.
DIStAnCES
we started by asking what effect law’s travels have on law itself and on 
the understanding of the world, of the conflicts and the normative ori-
entations of those who use it. this is because attention to the dialectic 
between the two is necessary to understand normative change that occurs 
as law travels and produces situations of legal pluralism (see, e.g., Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2005). Several dimensions of this have been addressed 
in the debates of legal anthropology. first, legal scholars have shown how 
so-called universal norms as expressed in the legal language and pro-
cedures of western law often fail to adequately capture the understand-
ings of situations, relationships and conflicts of those they are meant to 
protect (felstiner et al. 1980/1981; Merry 1990). Anthropologists in par-
ticular have pointed to the increasing hegemony of a western notion of 
the person, with its ideological baggage of autonomy, free will and the 
primacy of the individual and individualistic ‘interests’, which is prom-
ulgated by the spread of (western) law (Collier et al. 1995). Scholarly 
works increasingly focus on the legal classifications that are used to cat-
egorise people on the basis of their experiences of subjugation, exclu-
sion, deprivation and other forms of suffering (ross 2002; hastrup 2003; 
wilson 2003). notions of community (e.g. James 2006), indigeneity (e.g. 
Donahoe et al. 2008), gender (e.g. Merry 2003) and ‘victimhood’ (e.g. 
Mamdani 1996; Borneman 1997; wilson 2001, 2003; ross 2002; hastrup 
2003; Biner 2007) become embedded in law and are transmitted by vari-
ous discourses of rights and justice. this can lead to the transformation 
of the self-understanding of persons and groups who are recognised as 
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belonging to certain legal categories. for example, wilson argues that 
human rights discourse ‘draws upon Manichean dualisms (violated/vio-
lator; powerless/powerful) to construct its subjects as innocent victims’, 
and how it presents images of its subjects ‘as in “need” and inhabiting a 
social and global position of marginality’ (2009: 215). this has the effect 
of homogenising the category of victim by removing subjects from their 
social, family and class backgrounds, and thereby decontextualises and 
depoliticises human rights violations (wilson 2009: 224).
this process is clearly illustrated in Zerrin Özlem Biner’s analysis 
(Chapter 9) of a law designed to compensate people for losses incurred as 
a result of the military conflict between turkish armed forces and mili-
tants of the Kurdistan workers’ Party (PKK). the manner in which the 
law was implemented reduced the traumatic experiences of applicants to 
a cost-benefit calculation. In their well-intentioned efforts to help people 
take advantage of the compensation law, human rights activists and law-
yers instructed them to frame their highly personal experiences in terms 
of a standardised narrative of violence, which had the unintended effect 
of homogenising applicants and lumping them into a single undifferenti-
ated category of ‘victims’.
Secondly, and in a more general way, Biner’s case throws into high 
relief the fundamental gap between people’s aspirations for justice, 
on the one hand, and the legal interpretation of ‘justice’, on the other 
hand; between the ‘experience-near’ formulation of personal, localised 
understanding and awareness of a situation, and the ‘experience-distant 
language of jurisprudence’, as Stuart Kirsch (Chapter 1) describes it. In 
many ways, this gap is asymptotic; it can never be completely closed. 
Many of the contributions in this volume show that it is impossible ever 
to seamlessly translate the innumerable diverse experiences of people’s 
everyday lives into a legal language of any kind. this is particularly evi-
dent in gerhard Anders’s case (Chapter 4 in this volume), in which the 
Special Court for Sierra leone, established to prosecute war criminals, 
not only imposed specific narratives of violence and conflict, but raised 
and ultimately disappointed ordinary citizens’ expectations for a more 
encompassing vision of justice that they located in development and dis-
tributive justice.
As Derrida (1992) argues in his essay ‘force of law’, while law is an 
authorising, legitimising form, justice as it is imagined carries the ‘mes-
sianic promise’ of setting wrongs right, a promise that can only be 
imperfectly, if ever, captured, contained or actualised. this points us 
to the hope that is invested in law – and at the same time towards the 
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unbridgeable hiatus between this messianic promise and law’s mundane 
translations of hope into procedures. to what degree and under what cir-
cumstances this gap is actually experienced as problematic is an empir-
ical question; it depends on law’s promises in different legal fields and the 
expectations that it raises. there are many situations in which nobody 
expects legal representations of a situation, a relation or an issue to fully 
express their hopes and aspirations (see e.g. Zenker, Chapter 5). In other 
cases, particularly those dealing with social processes that fall under the 
rubrics of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘transitional justice’ (e.g. Anders, Chapter 
4; Biner, Chapter 9), law is overburdened with expectations and is there-
fore necessarily experienced as deficient and inadequate.
trAnSlAtIonS
notwithstanding the fundamental hiatus between law’s representations 
and people’s experiences, a third question – that of the degree to which it 
is possible to ‘translate’ legal concepts and terminologies from one socio-
politico-cultural milieu into another (watson 1974; legrand 1997) – has 
remained contentious. Several authors have proposed theories of what 
actually happens when law travels and is, for better or for worse, trans-
ported, transplanted, transmitted or translated from one context to 
another. one example of such a vision is the notion of ‘vernacularisa-
tion’. Vernacularisation suggests that a specific norm is transformed to 
fit into a specific cultural order – and is thus changed. levitt and Merry 
(2009) distinguish situations in which only the name of an imported 
norm or institution is changed in order to create the semblance of con-
formity with existing norms, while the content remains for the most 
part unaltered. this is a ‘replication’. At the other end of the spectrum 
is ‘hybridisation’, a merging of imported transnational norms or institu-
tions with local ones. An extreme form of hybridisation is subversion, in 
which the recognised ‘global name’ is adopted, but it is applied to a prac-
tice that is fundamentally in keeping with existing cultural practices. In 
such cases, while the name is retained the transnational institution or 
norm is fundamentally transformed (Merry 2006: 44).
Merry (2006) uses the notion of translation, originally adopted from 
Actor network theory, to analyse the networks of translators, namely 
the members of ngos who ‘translate’ legal norms between the vernacu-
lar notions of their clients and the legal language of the wider arenas. 
the focus on such translators points our attention to the structured 
interaction between different arenas: local concerns and international 
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forums in which these local concerns are connected to particular norms 
and thereby attributed relevance. the view on translators thus provides 
an insight into the power relations in which these networks relate to 
each other. what is translated by the translator is determined also by 
fashions and agendas set in arenas different from those whose concerns 
are negotiated.
while attention to translators can elucidate the power relations in 
which legal norms are negotiated, this use of the notion of translation 
suffers from the problem that the process of translation is cut short. 
translation does not stop at professional translators: users, clients, sub-
jects of law themselves make meaning of legal norms, and thus extend 
the chain of translations. one way to extend this chain, according to 
harri Englund (Chapter 3), would be to actively engage in a process 
of reverse translation, in which the claims that are expressed through 
local interpretations of law would be translated back in such a way 
that they have the possibility of influencing the global rights discourse. 
referring to Anna tsing (2005), Englund concludes: ‘If “globalization” 
is to have any other meaning than the diffusion of ideas and institu-
tions from centres into peripheries, it must include the possibility that 
those ideas and institutions may encounter friction that propels fresh 
travels.’
Moreover, vernacularisation, in as much as it assumes the conver-
gence (in whatever way) of two distinct normative systems as the rele-
vant process of legal pluralism, assumes a great deal of overlap between 
a social group and a delineated normative order, with the group being 
defined by shared norms and values. It must perceive people (particularly 
those ‘with culture’ and ‘without history’ – cf. wolf 1982) as primordially 
norm-bound, and their societies as normatively integrated and homoge-
neous. Such a perspective abstracts from the heterogeneity of normative 
orientations within social groups; it excludes from its analysis the strug-
gles over the meaning of norms within normative orders that are a defin-
ing feature of all social interaction.
the concept of culture that lies at the base of such notions has in 
many ways long been problematised. the ontological concept of coher-
ence and in this sense of normative integration disappeared with func-
tionalism – and with this a fundamental change of the concept of culture 
was developed. with a ‘pragmatic notion of culture’ (Schiffauer 2004: 
252) we can analyse culture as a continuing process of synthesis, dis-
tinction, differentiation and articulation within structured figurations. 
Such a perspective could inform our thinking about normative processes 
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